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Abstract:  
Market discipline for financial institutions can be imposed not only from the liability side, as 
has often been stressed in the literature on the use of subordinated debt, but also from the 
asset side. This will be particularly true if good lending opportunities are in short supply, so 
that banks have to compete for projects. In such a setting, borrowers may demand that banks 
commit to monitoring by requiring that they use some of their own capital in lending, thus 
creating an asset market-based incentive for banks to hold capital. Borrowers can also provide 
banks with incentives to monitor by allowing them to reap some of the benefits from the 
loans, which accrue only if the loans are in fact paid o.. Since borrowers do not fully 
internalize the cost of raising capital to the banks, the level of capital demanded by market 
participants may be above the one chosen by a regulator, even when capital is a relatively 
costly source of funds. This implies that capital requirements may not be binding, as recent 
evidence seems to indicate. 
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A common justiﬁcation for capital regulation for banks is the reduction of bank moral hazard.
Given the presence of deposit insurance, banks have easy access to deposit funds. If they
hold a low level of capital, there is an incentive for them to take on excessive risk. If the
risky investment pays oﬀ, the banks’ shareholders receive the payoﬀ. On the other hand, if
it does not, the bulk of the losses are borne either by depositors or by the body providing
deposit insurance. Given the widely accepted view that equity capital is more costly for
banks than other forms of funds, the common assumption in much of the extant analyses of
bank regulation is that capital adequacy standards should be binding as banks attempt to
economize on the use of this costly input.
In practice, however, it appears that the amount of capital held by banks has varied
substantially over time in a way that is diﬃcult to explain as a function of regulatory changes.
For example, Berger et al. (1995) report that in the 1840’s and 1850’s banks in the U.S.
had capital ratios of around 40 to 50 percent. These ratios fell dramatically throughout the
twentieth century, reaching a range of 6 to 8 percent in the 1940’s where they stayed until
the end of the 1980’s. More recent evidence in Flannery and Rangan (2004) suggests that
bank capital ratios have again increased, with banks in the U.S. now holding capital that
is 75% in excess of the regulatory minimum (see also Barth et al., 2005, for international
evidence).1 Given that capital adequacy standards were not in existence during much of the
nineteenth century, and have not ﬂuctuated much since their inception, it is hard to ﬁnd a
regulatory rationale to explain movements in banks’ capital holdings.
To better understand the role of bank capital and regulation, we present a simple model
of bank lending that incorporates two features widely believed to be important for banking
markets. First, we incorporate a consideration related to banks’ lending behavior into their
choice of ﬁnancing, recognizing that banks’ capital structures may have implications for their
1A recent study by Citigroup Global Markets (2005) ﬁnds that “... most European banks have and
generate excess capital”, with Tier 1 ratios signiﬁcantly above target. See also Alfon et al. (2004).
1ability to attract clients (e.g., borrowers). Second, we assume that banks perform a special
role as monitors or as producers of information. With these two features, we show that
costly capital is not a suﬃcient condition to guarantee that banks will minimize how much
capital they hold, implying that capital requirements need not be binding if banks operate in
a competitive market. Moreover, our model is static in nature, so we obtain this result even
abstracting from other, possibly important, dynamic considerations, such as those found in
Blum and Hellwig (1995), Bolton and Freixas (2005), or Peura and Keppo (2005).
The starting point of our model is that ﬁrms face an agency problem between sharehold-
ers and managers, which banks can help resolve by monitoring. Speciﬁcally, we assume that
the more monitoring a bank does, the greater is the probability that a ﬁrm’s investment is
successful. Bank monitoring therefore has two eﬀects in our model. First, it increases the
probability that the ﬁrm’s loan is repaid, thus increasing the return to the bank. Second,
it beneﬁts the ﬁrm’s owners since it increases the return on their investments. Firms there-
fore ﬁnd bank loans more desirable the greater is the underlying agency problem between
shareholders and managers of the ﬁrm.2
Given limited liability for the bank, we argue that borrowers can use two diﬀerent tools
to provide their lending bank with an incentive to monitor. One instrument is embodied
in the interest rate on the loan, since a marginal increase in the loan rate gives the bank
a greater incentive to monitor in order to receive the higher payoﬀ if the project succeeds.
This increased payoﬀ for the bank can also beneﬁtt h eﬁrm’s owners if it exceeds the extra
amount they pay the bank for the loan. A borrower can therefore use the interest payment
on the loan to pay for bank monitoring in a way that is contingent on the success of the
project. The second instrument is the amount of equity capital a bank has. The more capital
a bank holds, the greater the loss the bank’s owners will face if the loan is not repaid and
so the greater is the incentive to monitor. Put diﬀerently, capital helps solve the limited
2There are numerous possible interpretations for bank “monitoring” that are consistent with our analysis.
For instance, banks may perform a screening function that allows them to better determine the likelihood of
loan repayment for individual borrowers. This screening should beneﬁt borrowers by reducing cross-subsidies
and increasing the eﬃciency of loan pricing.
2liability problem banks face due to their extensive reliance on deposit-based ﬁnancing.3
We consider two distinct cases regarding the structure of the credit market in our analysis.
In the ﬁrst case, we assume that the demand for loans by ﬁrms with good projects exceeds
banks’ supply of funds so that borrowers must compete for funds. In the second case, we
assume instead that there is a shortage of good projects relative to the funds available so
that banks must compete for ﬁrms’ business and tailor their contracts so as to attract this
business.
When there is a shortage of bank funds available, we show that banks optimally choose to
hold no capital since equity is more costly than deposits, and limited liability protects them
from having to repay depositors when their loans are not repaid. Banks also raise the interest
rates on loans to the highest level that is consistent with ﬁrms being willing to borrow, and
it is this which provides them with an incentive to monitor. We also show that when the
cost of equity is not too much greater than the cost of deposits, a regulator interested in
maximizing social welfare would impose a requirement that banks hold a positive amount of
capital. This “capital requirement” leads to improved monitoring and reduces the cost to
the deposit insurance fund, an aspect which is not internalized by the banks. The banks,
however, would like to have as low a level of capital as possible so that any capital constraint
imposed by a regulator will be binding.
The case where there is an excess supply of bank funds is more complex. In equilibrium,
we ﬁnd that even in the absence of a regulator, banks will hold a positive amount of capital
in order to attract borrowers’ business. The reason is that capital acts as a commitment
device for banks to monitor, which is good for borrowers. Moreover, we also ﬁnd that the
loan rate most attractive to borrowers is also one that is suﬃciently high to induce banks
to monitor. These ﬁndings suggest that market discipline can be imposed not only from the
liability side, as has been stressed in the literature on the use of subordinated debt (for a
3Following the rest of the literature on capital regulation, in the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep a p e rw et a k ei ta sg i v e n
that there is deposit insurance. We relax this assumption in the later part of the paper to show that our
results are not driven by the existence of deposit insurance.
3review, see Flannery and Nikolova, 2004), but also from the asset side of the bank’s balance
sheet (see Kim et al., 2005, for evidence that borrowers may indeed exert a disciplinary
inﬂuence on banks’ behavior).
In this setting, we show that a regulator will in general want to choose a diﬀerent level
of capital than that obtained in the market equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, when the cost of
equity capital is relatively low, and is just above the cost of deposits, the regulator will want
to impose a capital requirement that is above the level of capital obtained in the market.
This occurs for the same reason as above, in that the cost of deposit insurance is not fully
internalized by banks or borrowers. By contrast, when the cost of equity capital is high
relative to the cost of deposits, the regulator may want to impose a capital requirement that
is lower than that in the market. The reason is that the borrowers do not fully internalize
the cost of equity capital and demand a high level of capital as a commitment for banks to
monitor. In this instance, any capital requirement set by a regulator would not be binding,
because competition for borrowers leads banks to hold greater amounts of capital than is
socially optimal.
We extend our model to the case where there is no deposit insurance and show that the
qualitative results of the base model are unaﬀected. Speciﬁcally, banks may have incentives
to hold capital above what would be socially optimal when there is an excess supply of funds
and banks have to compete for borrowers. Interestingly, in the absence of deposit insurance,
banks may prefer to hold a positive level of capital even in the case where there is an excess
demand for credit as a way of reducing their cost of borrowing from depositors.
The implications of our model are consistent with recent empirical observations, including
the capital buildup of banks during the 90’s, when the competitiveness of credit markets is
thought to have increased signiﬁcantly (for a discussion of this issue, see Boot and Thakor,
2000). Our model also oﬀers the surprising prediction that, ceteris paribus, borrowers should
be willing to pay higher interest rates to less-capitalized banks in order to provide them an
alternative incentive to monitor. This is consistent with recent work by Hubbard et al.
4(2002), who ﬁnd that borrowing from poorly-capitalized banks is more expensive, but only
for informationally-sensitive borrowers (see also Kim et al., 2005). Moreover, our model oﬀers
other cross-sectional implications concerning ﬁrms’ sources of borrowing. An implication of
our analysis is that borrowing from a well-capitalized bank that thus commits to monitoring,
is of greater value to ﬁrms with high agency problems. Firms for which monitoring adds little
value should prefer to borrow either from an arm’s length source of ﬁnancing or from a bank
with low capital. Billett et al. (1995) ﬁnds that lender “identity,” in the sense of the lender’s
credit rating, is an important determinant of the market’s reaction to the announcement of
a loan. To the extent that capitalization improves a lender’s rating and reputation, these
results are in line with the predictions of our model.
Recent research on the role of bank capital has studied the interaction between capital
and liquidity creation (Diamond and Rajan, 2000) and the role of capital in determining
banks’ lending capacities and providing incentives to monitor (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997).
Our approach is complementary to these, but instead focuses on how borrower demand for
monitoring services can itself lead banks to hold capital. Our paper is also related to studies
of the role of capital in reducing risk-taking, recent examples of which are Hellmann et al.
(2000) and Repullo (2004).
Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 considers ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing choice and banks’ choice
of monitoring taking the loan rates and capital amounts as given. The case where there is
an excess demand for credit is considered in Section 4, while the case where there is an
excess supply of funds is analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 extends the analysis to the case
where there is no deposit insurance, and where banks can engage in risk-shifting via their
monitoring decisions. Section 7 contains concluding remarks.
52M o d e l
Consider a simple one-period economy, with N banks and M ﬁrms. There are three parties:
ﬁrms (borrowers), an arm’s length credit market, and banks. We describe each of these
below.
Borrowers: Each ﬁrm can invest in a risky project with gross payoﬀ of R when successful
and 0 when not, and will choose to do so as long as the expected return from the project
is greater than what it can earn in its next best alternative, rB ≥ 0. The manager of the
ﬁrm can choose how much eﬀort E to spend in running the project and increase its success
probability at a cost of E2
2 , and how much time to spend on other activities, 1 − E,f o r
which he enjoys a private beneﬁt B. For simplicity, we also let E represent the probability of
success of the investment project, so that eﬀo r ti n c r e a s e st h ee x p e c t e dr e t u r no ft h ep r o j e c t
and reduces the probability of failure. The ﬁrm’s shareholders can choose between ﬁnancing
the project with an arm’s length loan or with a bank loan.
Credit market ﬁnancing: A competitive arm’s length market provides ﬁnancing at a gross
interest rate of rU. This loan is unmonitored, giving the ﬁrm’s manager full discretion in
choosing how much eﬀort to exert.
Banks: Banks ﬁnance themselves with an amount of capital k at a cost rE per unit, and
an amount of deposits 1 − k at a cost rD,w i t hrE ≥ rD. Deposits are fully insured so that
the deposit rate rD does not depend on the risk of bank portfolios. (We analyze the case
where there is no deposit insurance in Section 6.1.) This assumption captures the idea that
bank capital is a particularly expensive form of ﬁnancing, and that depositors don’t have
the specialized skills necessary to become bankers, therefore having a lower opportunity cost
(see Berger et al., 1995, for a discussion of this issue. Hellmann et al., 2000, and Repullo,
2004, make a similar assumption).4
4The assumption that rE ≥ rD is fairly standard in the literature, and is generally used to argue why
capital requirements should be binding, in that banks wish to minimize the use of the more costly input.
Eliminating this assumption only strengthens our results, as banks may then want to use capital as a cheaper
source of ﬁnancing relative to deposits.
6Banks can monitor their borrowers and by doing so inﬂuence managerial eﬀort. Specif-
ically, each bank chooses a monitoring eﬀort q and can constrain the manager’s actions so
that he exerts eﬀort E = q, but this comes at a cost of cq2 for the bank. The convex cost
function reﬂe c t st h ef a c tt h a ti ti si n c r e a s i n g l yd i ﬃcult for a bank to control the actions
of a borrower. Our modelling of bank monitoring captures the idea that banks can help
to reduce an agency problem between the shareholders and managers of the ﬁrm, and thus
increase value.5 We note, however, that there are other equally plausible interpretations of
the inﬂuence banks have on ﬁrms that are consistent with our model. For example, banks
may instead have to choose how much eﬀort to dedicate to screening borrowers. Firms would
beneﬁt from such screening by enjoying more accurate pricing of the risk associated with
their loans and avoiding cross-subsidies to less-eﬃcient borrowers.
Market structure: The loan rate rL and the amount of capital k are determined endoge-
nously, and can be set in one of two ways. They can either both be determined by the bank
or the amount of capital can be set by a regulator who maximizes social welfare. The market
is always competitive, but the solution will depend on the division of surplus between banks
and borrowers. We will distinguish between two cases for the allocation of surplus: ﬁrst,
the case where there is a shortage of funds available to lend (N<M ), and second the case
where there is a shortage of ﬁrms with good investment projects (N>M ).
Timing: The model can be divided into 4 stages. First, the level of bank capital k is
determined, either by the bank or by a regulator. Second, banks set the loan rate rL.6
Third, borrowers choose the loan that is most attractive to them. Finally, banks choose
their monitoring eﬀort q once the terms of the loan have been set and they have raised
capital and deposits.
5See, e.g., Besanko and Kanatas, 1993, Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997, Carletti, 2004, and Dell’Ariccia and
Marquez, 2005, for studies with a similar monitoring technology.
6Note that, in the absence of regulation, this timing structure is equivalent to assuming that k and rL
are set simultaneously.
73 Financing choice and bank monitoring
Before proceeding to the main analysis, it is useful to characterize the borrowers’ choice of
ﬁnancing source, as well as the banks’ choice of monitoring eﬀort taking as given the amount
of capital, k, and the pricing of the loans, rL. With an unmonitored (i.e., arm’s length) loan,
the manager of each ﬁrm chooses eﬀort E to maximize
max
E
πA = E (R − rU)+( 1− E)B −
E2
2
, (1)
where rU is the interest rate on an unmonitored loan. The solution to this problem yields
E
∗ =m a x{R − rU − B,0},( 2 )
with the additional condition that E ≤ 1. N o t et h a tt h em a n a g e r ’ se ﬀort is decreasing in
both the private beneﬁt B and the loan rate rU. The manager exerts the maximal eﬀort
E∗ = R−rU for B =0 , and reduces it as B increases. Similarly, E → 0 as rU → R−B<R .
The ﬁrm chooses the source of ﬁnancing that maximizes its value. That is, the ﬁrm
chooses to obtain a bank loan as long as the return, q(R − rL), is greater than if the loan is
unmonitored, E(R − rU). This can be expressed as
q(R − rL) > (R − rU − B)(R − rU)
or
B>R− rU − q
(R − rL)
(R − rU)
.( 3 )
Condition 3 shows that the choice between an unmonitored loan from the arm’s length
market and a monitored loan from a bank depends on the level of private beneﬁtf o rt h e
manager as well as the loan rates. Firms where managers have large private beneﬁts, so that
there is a severe agency problem, will prefer to borrow from banks as a way to solve the
8manager’s agency problem and commit to a higher level of monitoring. Also, a bank loan
will be preferred if the arm’s length market is not very attractive (if rU is high relative to
rL).
To ﬁnd the optimal level of monitoring for the banks, note that each of them chooses a
monitoring eﬀo r ts oa st om a x i m i z ee x p e c t e dp r o ﬁts. Since the bank’s revenues is rL −(1−
k)rD if the loan is repaid and zero if the loan defaults, the expected proﬁt can be expressed
as
max
q Π = q(rL − (1 − k)rD) − krE − cq
2. (4)
The solution to this problem yields
q
∗ =m i n
½
rL − (1 − k)rD
2c
,1
¾
(5)
as the optimal level of monitoring for each bank. Note that, when q<1, bank monitoring
eﬀo r ti si n c r e a s i n gi nt h er e t u r nf r o ml e n d i n g( rL)a sw e l la si nt h el e v e lo fc a p i t a l( k)t h e
bank holds, but is decreasing in the deposit rate (rD)a n di nc, a measure of the marginal
cost of monitoring.
We note that this framework implies a moral hazard problem in the choice of monitoring
when banks raise a positive amount of deposits. Since banks repay depositors only when
their portfolios succeed, they do not internalize the full cost of default on depositors. This
limited liability biases bank monitoring downwards. Capital forces banks to bear some of the
burden associated with non-performing loans, and therefore provides an incentive for banks
to monitor. Thus, a possible rationale for regulation is to limit moral hazard and raise the
level of monitoring. This is illustrated by noting that, in the absence of limited liability, the
equilibrium level of monitoring would be b q =m i n
©rL
2c,1
ª
≥ q∗, with the inequality strict
whenever q∗ < 1. Since our focus is on bank monitoring and regulation, in what follows we
restrict attention to the case where ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to borrow from a bank.
94 Excess demand for credit
We begin with the case where there is a shortage of loanable funds relative to the demand
for credit, which implies that banks will be able to obtain their preferred terms. This case
reﬂects a situation where there are fewer banks than investment projects (N<M ), so that
borrowers compete away the return on their projects in order to attract funding.
Banks set k and rL so as to maximize their expected proﬁts, taking into account their
subsequent monitoring choice and the fact that borrowers accept the loans only if they have
a non-negative surplus. Thus, the proﬁt-maximizing contract solves the following problem:
max
k,rL
Π = q(rL − (1 − k)rD) − krE − cq
2 (6)
subject to
q =m i n
½
rL − (1 − k)rD
2c
,1
¾
;
CS = q(R − rL) ≥ rB;
0 ≤ k ≤ 1.
The ﬁrst constraint represents the monitoring eﬀort that banks choose in order to maximize
expected proﬁts after lending to borrowers, which was obtained above. The second constraint
is the participation constraint of borrowers, labelled as consumer surplus (CS), and states
that borrowers will be willing to accept loans only if they can earn an expected return no
less than rB. The last constraint is simply a physical constraint on the level of capital, in
that banks can choose between raising only deposits, a mixture of deposits and capital, or
being entirely equity ﬁnanced.
The solution to this maximization problem yields the following result.
Proposition 1 When there is an excess demand for credit, banks maximize proﬁts by holding
no capital (k =0 )a n do ﬀering a loan rate equal to the maximum possible return on the
10project, minus an adjustment to account for the borrower’s reservation value (rL = R−
rB
q ).
Banks exert monitoring eﬀort q =m i n
©R−rD
2c ,1
ª
and earn positive expected proﬁts (Π > 0).
Proof: See the appendix. ¤
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is simple. When there is an excess supply of proﬁtable
lending opportunities, banks will retain all the surplus from investment projects as borrowers
compete away their own returns in order to attract funds. Since equity is more costly to
banks, they choose to ﬁnance themselves entirely with deposits. Banks beneﬁtf r o mah i g h
loan rate in two ways. First, a high loan rate provides them with a large return, all things
equal. Second, a high loan rate also give banks greater incentives to monitor. Loan rates
and capital are indeed two alternative ways to provide banks with monitoring incentives,
but they diﬀer in their impact. Raising capital entails a direct cost only for banks, whereas
increasing loan rates has a negative impact only for borrowers. Banks therefore oﬀer to lend
at the highest rate that borrowers’ are willing to accept.
Given banks’ desire to minimize their holdings of capital, there may be scope for capital
regulation in this context. Due to limited liability, banks do not internalize the full cost
of default, and simply choose their level of capital and loan prices so as to maximize their
expected proﬁts. By contrast, a regulator interested in maximizing social welfare, which
includes the cost borne by the deposit insurance fund, would solve the following problem:
max
k
SW = Π + CS − (1 − q)(1 − k)rD
= qR− (1 − k)rD − krE − cq
2 (7)
11subject to
q =m i n
½
rL − (1 − k)rD
2c
,1
¾
;
rL =a r g m a x
r Π(r);
CS = q(R − rL) ≥ rB;
0 ≤ k ≤ 1.
The optimization problem is similar to before, with the important diﬀerence that the regula-
tor chooses only the level of capital, and that it does so in order to maximize social welfare.
T h el o a nr a t ei ss t i l ls e ta sp a r to ft h em a r ket solution, as given in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 When there is an excess demand for credit, capital regulation that maximizes
social welfare requires that banks hold capital equal to k =1− 2c
r2
D(rE −rD),w h i c hi sp o s i t i v e
as long as rD > max
n
R − 2c,
p
c(c +2 rE) − c
o
.
Proof: See the appendix. ¤
Proposition 2 implies that welfare-maximizing capital regulation requires a positive level
of capital due to its positive incentive eﬀect on bank monitoring. This occurs when the
required return for depositors rD is suﬃciently high that banks would not monitor fully
when they have no capital (i.e., when rD >R− 2c) ,a n da l s oh i g he n o u g ht h a tt h ep o s i t i v e
incentive eﬀect on social welfare of raising capital outweighs the cost rE (i.e., when rD >
p
c(c +2 rE) − c).
Comparing Propositions 1 and 2 leads to the following immediate result.
Proposition 3 When there is an excess demand for credit, capital regulation requires banks
to hold a higher amount of capital than the market if rD > max
n
R − 2c,
p
c(c +2 rE) − c
o
.
This result establishes that a regulator will often require a higher amount of capital than
the amount that maximizes banks’ proﬁts, and never a lower amount. Regulation can thus
12be beneﬁcial as it increases social welfare relative to what would be obtained under the
market solution. In these instances, there is a rationale for capital regulation as a way of
providing banks with incentives to monitor.
5 Excess supply of funds
We now turn to the case where there is a shortage of good lending opportunities for banks
relative to the funds the banking system has available to lend. In this case, banks will have
to set contract terms competitively in order to attract borrowers, who will generally be able
to appropriate most, if not all, of the surplus associated with their projects. In contrast to
the previous section, this case reﬂects the situation where there are fewer investment projects
than banks (M<N ).
The capital holdings and interest rate that maximize borrower surplus solve the following
problem:
max
k,rL
CS = q(R − rL) (8)
subject to
q =m i n
½
rL − (1 − k)rD
2c
,1
¾
;
Π = q(rL − (1 − k)rD) − krE − cq
2 ≥ 0;
0 ≤ k ≤ 1;
1 ≤ rL ≤ R;
where, as before, Π represents bank proﬁts, q is the monitoring eﬀo r tt h a te a c hb a n kc h o o s e s
as a function of rL and k,a n dCS represents consumer surplus. Note that, in contrast to the
previous section, we now impose a participation constraint for banks, in that they must earn
non-negative proﬁts, and a constraint that the loan rate not be higher than the maximum
return from the project. We will assume throughout that there is enough surplus generated
13from lending that the borrowers’ participation constraint is always satisﬁed when consumer
surplus is being maximized. We can now state the following result, which focuses on the
case of an interior solution for bank monitoring. The more general case is relegated to the
appendix.
Proposition 4 Assume that R<4c. When there is an excess supply of funds, consumer
surplus is maximized by setting a loan rate of rL =
R+(1−kCS)rD
2 and having banks hold
capital equal to kCS =m i n
½
8crE−RrD+r2
D−4
t
rEc(4crE−RrD+r2
D)
r2
D ,1
¾
. Equilibrium monitoring is
q =
R−(1−kCS)rD
4c < 1.F o r c> R2
16rE, banks earn zero expected proﬁts, while for c< R2
16rE,
kCS =1 , and banks earn positive expected proﬁts.
Proof: See the appendix, which contains a full characterization of the equilibrium. ¤
The results in Proposition 4 highlight the incentive mechanisms for bank monitoring
provided by a competitive credit market. There are two ways of providing banks with
incentives to monitor: by requiring that they hold a minimum amount of capital kCS,a n d
by setting the rate rL on the loan so as to compensate them for their monitoring when the
project is successful and the loan is repaid. Both of these variables increase bank monitoring,
but diﬀer in terms of their costs and their eﬀects on consumer surplus and bank proﬁts.
Borrowers would like banks to hold large amounts of capital so as to commit to exert a high
level of monitoring, as borrowers’ returns increase with q but they do not fully internalize
the costs of capital and of monitoring. By contrast, since capital is a costly input (i.e.,
rE ≥ rD), banks would prefer to minimize its use and to instead receive incentives through
a higher loan rate, rL. However, while increasing rL is good for incentive purposes, its direct
eﬀect is to reduce the surplus to the borrowers. Raising rL will therefore eventually reduce
borrower surplus, and this occurs when the positive incentive eﬀect of a higher loan rate on
bank monitoring is dominated by the negative direct eﬀect on consumer surplus, R − rL.
Thus, when borrowers obtain the surplus, banks have to raise a positive amount of capital
to attract borrowers.
14The exact amounts of monitoring and capital in equilibrium depend on the return of
investment projects R, the cost of capital rE,a n dt h ec o s to fm o n i t o r i n gc.W h e np r o j e c t s
are not very proﬁtable (R<4c) but capital is not too costly (rE <c ), banks raise the
highest level of capital, but do not monitor fully since the cost of doing so would be too
high. If capital is relatively costly, however, so that rE >c , market incentives lead banks to
choose a lower level of capital (kCS < 1), less monitoring (q<1), or both. The participation
constraint of banks prevents them from raising the highest level of capital, thus leading to
a lower level of monitoring. In the appendix, we also present the case where projects are
highly proﬁtable (R ≥ 4c), and show that, when capital is not too costly, banks exert the
maximum eﬀort, q =1 , and raise the highest level of capital, kCS =1 . Borrowers want banks
to monitor fully as projects are very proﬁtable, and can induce banks to do so by raising
only capital, as long as this is not too costly and banks’ proﬁts are positive. When capital
is costly, however, banks will again choose a lower level of capital and/or less monitoring.
Interestingly, borrowers may be willing to give up some of the return on the loans to
the banks in order to provide them with incentives to monitor. They accomplish this by
allowing the loan rates to reﬂect the returns of the projects, and to be increasing in such
r e t u r n sa sl o n ga st h e r ea r ei n c e n t i v ee ﬀects from doing so (as long as q<1):
∂rL
∂R > 0.I n
other words, the loan’s price need not be set only to compensate banks for the credit risk
associated with granting the loan, but also to induce them to exert eﬀort in monitoring the
projects and thus improve the expected returns of the loans. Furthermore, since capital and
loan rates are alternative instruments for providing banks with an incentive to monitor, we
note that the equilibrium value of rL is decreasing in the level of capital k. This implies
that these are substitute instruments from the point of view of borrowers, who only trade
oﬀ their relative costs from the perspective of reducing consumer surplus. The ﬁndings in
Hubbard et al. (2002) and Kim et al. (2005) lend support to this result, in that they ﬁnd
that interest rates are higher on loans from less-capitalized banks.
The complement to Proposition 2 from the previous section is to analyze the optimal
15choice of capital from a social welfare perspective when we assume that there is an excess
supply of funds, and rates are set as part of a market solution to maximize the return to
borrowers. In other words, a regulator would solve the following problem.
max
k
SW = Π + CS − (1 − q)(1 − k)rD
= qR− (1 − k)rD − krE − cq
2 (9)
subject to
q =m i n
½
rL − (1 − k)rD
2c
,1
¾
;
rL =a r g m a x
r CS = q(R − r)
0 ≤ k ≤ 1.
Again, we focus here on the case of an interior solution, and leave the other cases, which are
qualitatively similar, to the appendix.
Proposition 5 Assume that R<2c
2rE−rD
rD . When there is an excess supply of funds, cap-
ital regulation that maximizes social welfare requires banks to hold capital equal to kreg =
min
n
RrD+r2
D−8c(rE−rD)
r2
D ,1
o
, which is less than 1 for R<8c
(rE−rD)
rD a n de q u a lt o1o t h e r w i s e .
Equilibrium monitoring is q =
R−(1−kreg)rD
4c < 1.
Proof: See the appendix, which contains a full characterization of the equilibrium. ¤
While the interest rate on the loan is determined in a competitive market setting and not
subject to regulatory interference, a regulator may want to impose a capital requirement for
banks in order to ensure they have suﬃcient incentives to monitor. In contrast to Proposition
2, now the regulator is more likely to require that banks hold a positive amount of capital, and
this amount is greater than in the case where bank funds are in short supply. The reason
is that the market sets a lower loan rate when borrowers obtain the surplus than when
16banks obtain it and, therefore, the regulator has to use more capital to provide banks with
incentives to monitor. Optimal regulation, however, does not necessarily call for “narrow
banking” in the sense of having fully capitalized intermediaries, but rather allows for a mix
between capital and deposit-based ﬁnancing. This will generally be true when the cost of
capital relative to deposits, rE −rD, is high, or when the aggregate return from encouraging
greater monitoring, R, is relatively low.
We now turn to one of the main results in the paper, which is whether a pure market-
based system is likely to provide suﬃcient incentives for bank discipline and monitoring, and
whether capital regulation can be an eﬀective tool for providing such incentives. For that,
we have the following:
Proposition 6 For all R,rE,a n dc, there exists a value e rD(R,rE,c) > 0 such that kreg <
kCS for rD < e rD,a n dkreg ≥ kCS for rD ≥ e rD.
Proof: See the appendix. ¤
While the exact expressions for e rD are provided in the proof, the interpretation of this
result can be stated quite generally for all parameter values as follows. When capital is much
more expensive than deposits (rD << rE), it is socially optimal to economize on capital
and instead rely more heavily on deposits for ﬁnancing the bank. The market solution, by
contrast, will demand that banks hold an excessive level of capital when there is a shortage of
good lending opportunities and credit markets are competitive. At the other extreme, when
bank capital is not signiﬁcantly more costly than deposits, regulators desire that banks hold
more capital than the market requires. The reason is that the regulator internalizes both
the cost of raising capital as well as the cost to the deposit insurance fund. Thus, when
the diﬀerence rE − rD is high, the regulator chooses to impose a lower capital requirement
because capital is socially more costly than repaying depositors in case of bank default. By
contrast, when the diﬀerence rE − rD is low, the regulator prefers to require a high level of
capital and reduce the costs of bank default.
17The result of Proposition 6 also suggests that, when capital is relatively expensive, capital
regulation is not likely to be binding as market incentives will induce banks to hold greater
amounts of capital than is socially optimal. In other words, a minimum capital requirement
imposed by a regulator, as well as changes in this requirement, would have no eﬀect on
banks’ aggregate holdings of capital.7 In fact, social welfare maximization would call for a
ceiling being placed on the level of capital, or a tax on its use so as to discourage banks from
holding excessive capital.
The contrast between the ﬁnding in Proposition 6 and that in Proposition 3 is clear.
When there is a shortage of bank funds and banks are able to appropriate most of the
surplus from lending, capital regulation plays a clear role in increasing bank monitoring and
reducing the probability of failure. However, when there is an excess supply of funds and loan
rates are relatively low, the market may demand bank monitoring by requiring that banks
hold a higher amount of capital. The eﬀectiveness of capital regulation, therefore, clearly
depends on the structure of the market for bank credit. When there is an excess demand
for credit, establishing a capital adequacy requirement can be a useful way of imposing bank
discipline, reducing the burden to the insurance fund and raising social welfare. By contrast,
when there is an excess supply of funds, the incentives provided in the market as banks
c o m p e t et oa t t r a c tb o r r o w e r sm a yl e a db a n k st oh o l de x c e s s i v ea m o u n t so fc a p i t a l ,s ot h a t
capital adequacy requirements become ineﬀective and unnecessary.
6E x t e n s i o n s
In this section we look at two important extensions. First, we consider the case where there is
no deposit insurance, so that banks must internalize the cost imposed on depositors of their
inability to repay deposits when their projects fail. Second, we consider a simple extension
to allow for banks to shift risk in their choice of investments.
7This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Ashcraft (2001), who ﬁnds little evidence that tougher capital
requirements were responsible for the increase in capital ratios throughout the 1980’s.
186.1 The Case Without Deposit Insurance
Up to now we have considered only the case where deposits are fully insured, so that the
interest rate paid on deposits is determined entirely by depositors’ opportunity cost, given
by rD. A concern, however, is that banks’ incentives to economize on the use of capital may
be driven by the ﬁxed-cost nature of deposits, which are not sensitive to risk when they are
fully insured. In this section we analyze the case where deposits are not insured, so that the
promised repayment must compensate depositors for the risk they face when placing their
money in banks that may not repay. This introduces a liability-side disciplining force on
bank behavior and capital holdings since banks will have to bear the cost of their risk-taking
through a higher deposit rate.
Consider the following slight change to the model. The timing is modiﬁed as follows.
F i r s t ,b a n k sc h o o s eh o wm u c ht or a i s ei nd e p o s i t s( 1 − k) and capital (k); the promised
repayment on deposits (i.e., the deposit rate) cD is then also set. Second, the loan rate rL
is determined. Third, borrowers choose the loan that is most attractive to them. Fourth,
banks choose their monitoring eﬀort q once the terms of the loan have been set. Note that
the only change is the introduction of the setting of the deposit rate cD in stage 1.
Deposits are uninsured, so that the expected value of their promised payment cD must be
equal to depositors’ opportunity cost rD.G i v e nk, depositors conjecture a level of monitoring
for the bank, qc, and set the deposit rate to meet their reservation return, which is given by
rD.T h i si m p l i e st h a tqccD = rD,o rt h a tcD =
rD
qc .
We now solve the model by backward induction. For a given cD,b a n k sc h o o s em o n i t o r i n g
to maximize
max
q Π = q(rL − (1 − k)cD) − krE − cq
2. (10)
For an interior solution, this problem yields q∗ =
rL−(1−k)cD
2c . In equilibrium, depositors’ con-
jecture about monitoring must be correct, so that qc = q∗. We can therefore substitute cD =
rD
q∗ into the solution above for q and solve for the equilibrium value of monitoring. There are
19two solutions, q1 = 1
4c
³
rL +
p
r2
L − 8crD (1 − k)
´
and q2 = 1
4c
³
rL −
p
r2
L − 8crD (1 − k)
´
,
with q1 >q 2. However, it is straightforward to show that both banks and borrowers are
better oﬀ with the higher level of monitoring. To see this, note that, in equilibrium, bank
proﬁts are given by
Π(q)=q(rL − (1 − k)
rD
q
) − krE − cq
2 = qrL − (1 − k)rD − krE − cq
2, (11)
which is strictly increasing in q for q ≤
rL
2c.S i n c eq2 <q 1 <
rL
2c, banks prefer the equilibrium
with the higher level of monitoring. From the ﬁrm’s perspective, its equilibrium return is
either equal to rB when borrowers compete for funds or it is just CS(q)=q(R − rL) when
banks compete for borrowers. In the former case, the borrowers are indiﬀerent to the choice
of q, whereas in the latter case, substituting for the equilibrium interest rate rL =
R+(1−k)cD
2 ,
we have
CS(q)=q
Ã
R −
R +( 1− k)
rD
q
2
!
=
1
2
(qR− (1 − k)rD), (12)
which again is strictly increasing in q. Since depositors are indiﬀerent between the two levels
of monitoring, the higher level of monitoring, q1, yields a Pareto-superior equilibrium. We
focus on this equilibrium in what follows.
Having solved the last stage, stages 2 and 3 follow along the lines of the previous sections.
The rate on the loan, rL, is given either by the maximum rate that is consistent with
borrowers’ participation constraints when there is an excess supply of projects, or by the
rate that maximizes the return to borrowers,
R+(1−k)cD
2 , when there is an excess supply of
funds. Solving the ﬁrst stage, where banks or the regulator choose the level of capital, we
obtain the following result.
Proposition 7 When there is an excess supply of funds (N>M ) and no deposit insurance,
there exists a value ˆ rD(R,rE,c) > 0 such that kreg <k CS for rD < ˆ rD.
Proof: See the appendix. ¤
20The proposition establishes that one of our main results, that market-driven incentives
can lead banks to hold more capital than is socially optimal, continues to hold even for
the case where deposits are not insured. Moreover, it holds under similar conditions as
before: when the opportunity cost of deposits is low relative to the cost of bank capital.
The intuition is similar to that in the previous section, in that the market solution does not
fully internalize all the costs and beneﬁts associated with holding capital. Speciﬁcally, when
there is an excess supply of funds banks need to adjust their oﬀers to attract borrowers, and
end up competing their return away. However, the trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁt of increased
monitoring and the cost of capital is not the same for borrowers as it is for the society.
From a social welfare perspective, requiring that banks hold large amounts of capital has a
l a r g en e g a t i v ei m p a c to nb a n kp r o ﬁts when capital is relatively costly, and this reduction in
proﬁts may more than oﬀset any gains to borrowers from increased monitoring. Borrowers,
of course, do not fully internalize this eﬀect, and may demand a higher level of capital than
what is socially optimal.
It is also worth pointing out that, unlike the case with deposit insurance, banks may now
wish to hold some capital even when funding is in short supply and borrowers must compete
for funding. The following proposition formalizes this result.
Proposition 8 When there is an excess demand for credit (N<M ), banks will hold a
positive amount of capital (i.e., k>0)f o rrD suﬃciently large.
Proof: See the appendix. ¤
The intuition for this result is as follows. When the deposit rate is constant, banks
have no incentive to hold any capital since capital is a costly form of ﬁnancing. In the
absence of deposit insurance, however, capital signals a commitment to monitor on the part
of the bank. Depositors recognize this greater incentive to monitor by banks and reduce the
interest payment they demand on their deposits. Banks may therefore have an incentive to
hold capital as a way of reducing their cost of funding, and this incentive is greatest when the
21cost of deposits is high relative to the cost of equity (i.e., when rD is close to rE). One way of
interpreting this ﬁnding is that capital can be valuable even when the payment to depositors
accurately reﬂects the risk they bear, so that banks internalize the cost of their risk-taking.
In other words, there is scope for bank capital to improve welfare even when there is a clear
channel for discipline from the liability side of the bank’s balance sheet. Finally, we note
that since borrowers compete away their surplus, the regulator’s maximization problem is
equivalent to the market’s problem, so there is no additional role for regulation.
6.2 Banks and Asset Substitution
I nt h ea n a l y s i sa b o v e ,w eh a v ea s s u m e dt h r o u g h o u tt h a tb a n km o n i t o r i n gi ss t r i c t l yv a l u e -
increasing, in that greater monitoring increases the expected return of the projects at the
same time that it reduces the probability of failure. Here, we brieﬂya n a l y z et h ec a s ew h e r e
banks may suﬀer from an asset substitution problem due to limited liability: since they are
highly leveraged, they may have an incentive to take on risky projects, shifting some of the
risk onto creditors. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the maximum return on the projects, R,i s
ad e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no fq, R0 < 0, so that for low monitoring, the return on the projects is
high but risky. By contrast, when a bank monitors a lot and q is high, the return on the
project is lower, but the project is safer. For simplicity, we focus only on the case where
there is a shortage of funds.
Given cD,e x p e c t e dp r o ﬁts for the bank can be expressed as
max
q Π = q(R −
rB
q
− (1 − k)cD) − krE − cq
2. (13)
T h eF O Cf o ra ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o ni s
R − (1 − k)cD − 2cq + q
∂R
∂q
=0 , (14)
which deﬁnes the equilibrium value of monitoring, q∗.N o t et h a t ,i f∂R
∂q is suﬃciently negative,
22it could be that the no monitoring is ever optimal. We assume therefore that ∂R
∂q, while
negative, is of suﬃciently small magnitude that at least some monitoring is always optimal.
We can now use the FOC to ﬁnd
∂q
∂k by use of the implicit function theorem (IFT). Deﬁne
G ≡ R − (1 − k)cD − 2cq + q∂R
∂q, which is identically equal to 0. By the IFT,
∂q
∂k = −
∂G
∂k
∂G
∂q
.
However, since the problem is concave in q,w eh a v et h a t∂G
∂q < 0, which means that the
sign of
∂q
∂k i st h es a m ea st h es i g no f∂G
∂k = cD > 0. Therefore,
∂q
∂k > 0, implying that capital
provides incentives to monitor. Therefore, we conclude that our results continue to hold
even in the case where limited liability for banks creates a risk-shifting problem.
7 Concluding remarks
A standard view of capital regulation is that it oﬀsets the risk-taking incentives provided by
deposit insurance. A common approach in the study of bank regulation has been to assume
that any capital requirements will be binding, since equity capital is generally believed to
more costly than other forms of ﬁnance. However, in many cases such as the U.S. in the 1990’s
they appear not to be binding. In this paper we have developed an alternative view of capital
that is consistent with the observation that capital constraints may or may not be binding.
In particular, when there is an excess supply of funds relative to the number of attractive
projects available so that banks compete for projects, the level of capital determined by the
market can be higher than the level required by a regulator that maximizes social welfare.
Our main results continue to hold even in the absence of deposit insurance. First, we
show that the market equilibrium can still involve a positive level of capital, whether there
is an excess supply or a shortage of bank funds. In addition, the optimal amount of capital
from a social welfare point of view can be above or below the equilibrium level in the market.
Our model has a number of implications which are in line with recent empirical observa-
tions. First, it suggests that capital requirements may not bind when, as in the last decade
(see, e.g., Boot and Thakor, 2000), the competitiveness of credit markets increases. Second,
23in line with the results in Kim et al. (2005), the model shows that also borrowers can impose
discipline on banks by demanding they hold capital as a commitment devise to exert moni-
toring. Finally, an interesting empirical implication of our analysis is that bank monitoring,
and thus capital holdings, are of more value to ﬁrms with high agency problems. Firms for
which monitoring has little value should prefer to borrow either from an arm’s length source
of ﬁnancing, or from a bank with low capital, and thus lower costs. Billett et al. (1995) ﬁnds
that lender “identity”, in the sense of the lender’s credit rating, is an important determinant
of the market’s reaction to the announcement of a loan. To the extent that capitalization
improves a lender’s rating and reputation, these results are consistent with the predictions
of our model.
24AP r o o f s
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :Substituting q in bank proﬁts, we obtain
Π =
(rL − (1 − k)rD)2
4c
− krE.
Diﬀerentiating proﬁts with respect to k gives
dΠ
dk
=
(rL − (1 − k)rD)rD
2c
− rE
= qrD − rE ≤ 0,a sq ≤ 1 and rE ≥ rD.
This implies that k =0 .F u r t h e r m o r e ,f o rrL ≥ rD,
dΠ
drL
=
(rL − (1 − k)rD)
2c
≥ 0 ∀rL ≤ R,
implying that bank proﬁts are always increasing in the interest rate rL. However, since the
bank must satisfy the borrower’s participation constraint, the maximum interest rate that
can be charged satisﬁes qc(R − rL) ≥ rB,w h e r eqc is the level of monitoring that borrowers
conjecture will take place. Since in equilibrium borrowers anticipate correctly how much
monitoring takes place, we have that rL = R −
rB
q . ¤
Proof of Proposition 2: Substituting rL = R−
rB
q and k =0in the expression for q gives
q =m i n
½
R − rD
2c
,1
¾
.
Thus, q =1if R − rD ≥ 2c,a n dq<1 if R − rD < 2c.
Substituting rL = R −
rB
q and keeping k>0, social welfare becomes
SW =
(R − (1 − k)rD)2
4c
− krE − [1 −
(R − (1 − k)rD)
2c
](1 − k)rD.
25Diﬀerentiating SW with respect to k,w eh a v e
dSW
dk
=
(R − (1 − k)rD)rD
2c
− rE − [−
(1 − k)r2
D
2c
− rD +
(R − (1 − k)rD)rD
2c
]=0
=
(1 − k)r2
D
2c
+ rD − rE =0 .
Calculating this expression at the two extreme levels of capital gives
dSW
dk
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
k=1
= rD − rE ≤ 0,
and
dSW
dk
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
k=0
=
r2
D
2c
+ rD − rE R 0,
implying that the welfare-maximizing level of capital is k∗ ∈ (0,1) if rD >
p
c(c +2 rE) − c,
and is given by
k
∗ =1−
2c
r2
D
(rE − rD) < 1,
thus establishing the proposition. ¤
Proposition 4B When there is an excess supply of funds, maximizing borrower surplus
yields the following equilibrium:
1) For R ≥ 4c, monitoring is q =1 . The loan rate is rL =( 1− kCS)rD +2 c,a n db a n k s
a r er e q u i r e dt oh o l dc a p i t a lkCS equal to kCS =m i n
n
c
rE,1
o
.F o rkCS =1(i.e., if c>r E),
banks earn proﬁts Π = c − rE > 0,o t h e r w i s eΠ =0 .
2) For R<4c, monitoring is q =
R−(1−kCS)rD
4c < 1.T h el o a nr a t ei srL =
R+(1−kCS)rD
2 ,
and banks hold capital equal to kCS =m i n
½
8crE−RrD+r2
D−4
t
rEc(4crE−RrD+r2
D)
r2
D ,1
¾
,w h i c hi s
less than 1 for c> R2
16rE and equal to one otherwise. For kCS =1 , Π = R2
16c − rE > 0,a n d
Π =0for kCS < 1.
Proof: Start by noting that, since q =m i n
n
rL−(1−k)rD
2c ,1
o
,i frL < (1 − k)rD +2 c then
q =
rL−(1−k)rD
2c < 1.S i n c eCS = q(R−rL),w eh a v et h a t∂CS
∂k =
∂q
∂k(R−rL)=
rD
2c (R−rL) > 0
26for q<1. Therefore, more capital increases consumer surplus.
We proceed in two stages, starting by maximizing CS with respect to the loan’s price,
rL,f o raﬁxed k, which yields
∂CS
∂rL
=
∂q
∂rL
(R − rL) − q =
R − 2rL +( 1− k)rD
2c
=0 .
Solving the FOC yields rL =
R+(1−k)rD
2 .
We can now maximize CS with respect to the choice of capital, k. However, we know
f r o ma b o v et h a tt h ec o m b i n a t i o no frL =
R+(1−k)rD
2 and the highest possible k will be
optimal for borrowers. We therefore introduce the participation constraint for the bank,
that Π = q(rL − (1 − k)rD) − krE − cq2 ≥ 0. Substituting for q =
rL−(1−k)rD
2c as well as for
rL,w eo b t a i n
Π =
(R − (1 − k)rD)
2
16c
− krE ≥ 0,k ≤ 1.
We can solve this for the value of k that satisﬁes the constraint with equality (Π =0 ). Since
Π is strictly convex in k, 0 ≤ k ≤ 1, and consumer surplus is increasing in k,t h er e l e v a n t
solution must be either the smaller root or a corner solution at k =1 . The solution is then
k
CS =m i n
(
8crE − RrD + r2
D − 4
p
rEc(4crE − RrD + r2
D)
r2
D
,1
)
.
Note that if kCS =1 ,t h e nrL = R
2.
We now check when in fact q<1. From the deﬁnition of the optimal level of monitoring
q =m i n
n
rL−(1−k)rD
2c ,1
o
,w es e et h a t ,f o rrL ≥ (1 − k)rD +2 c, q =1 . Substituting in the
optimal value for rL gives the following condition:
R +( 1− k)rD
2
≥ (1 − k)rD +2 c.
The right hand side is maximized at k =0 .T h u s , a s u ﬃcient condition for q =1is that
R − rD − 4c ≥ 0. In this case, there is no beneﬁt in terms of greater monitoring to having
27a higher interest rate on the loan, and so borrowers should just require the lowest possible
interest rate consistent with q =1 , which is satisﬁed by rL =( 1− k)rD +2 c.I f w e a g a i n
substitute this value of rL into the expression for bank proﬁts we obtain
Π =
¡
rL − (1 − k
CS)rD
¢
− k
CSrE − c = c − k
CSrE,
which, after setting equal to zero, yields kCS = c
rE as long as c<r E. In this case, we have
rL =( 1− c
rE)rD +2 c =(
rE−c
rE )rD +2 c.
Otherwise, for c>r E, kCS =1 , which implies that rL =2 c. Moreover, substituting this
value of rL into q =m i n
n
rL−(1−kCS)rD
2c ,1
o
and observing that kCS =1 ,w eo b t a i nt h a tΠ > 0
and q =m i n
©
R
4c,1
ª
=1for R ≥ 4c, and is less than 1 otherwise. All together, this implies
that q ≥ 1 for R ≥ 4c,a n dq<1 for R<4c. ¤
Proposition 5B When there is an excess supply of funds, capital regulation that maximizes
social welfare requires:
1) For R>2c
2rE−rD
rD , monitoring is q =m i n
©
R
4c,1
ª
, and capital equals kreg =m i n
n
4c+rD−R
rD ,1
o
,
which is less than 1 for R>4c and equal to 1 otherwise.
2) For R<2c
2rE−rD
rD , monitoring is q =
R−(1−kreg)rD
4c < 1 and capital equals kreg =
min
n
RrD+r2
D−8c(rE−rD)
r2
D ,1
o
, which is less than 1 for R<8c
(rE−rD)
rD and equal to 1 otherwise.
Proof: Start by maximizing social welfare with respect to k, assuming that the loan rate is
set to maximize CS, i.e., that rL =
R+(1−k)rD
2 . Social welfare is given by
max
k
SW = Π + CS − (1 − q)(1 − k)rD = qR− (1 − k)rD − krE − cq
2.
We can now take the ﬁrst order condition to get
∂SW
∂k
=
∂q
∂k
(R − 2cq) − rE + rD.
28We know that, for q<1, the optimal level of monitoring is q =
rL−(1−k)rD
2c . Substituting in
the value of rL a b o v ew eg e tq =
R−(1−k)rD
4c . We therefore have that
∂SW
∂k
=
rD
4c
µ
R +( 1− k)rD
2
¶
+ rD − rE =0 .
T h es o l u t i o nw eo b t a i ni s
k
reg =m i n
½
RrD + r2
D − 8c(rE − rD)
r2
D
,1
¾
.
From this expression, we obtain that kreg < 1 for c>
RrD
8(rE−rD) ⇔ R<8c
(rE−rD)
rD . Otherwise,
for R>8c
(rE−rD)
rD ,w eh a v et h a tkreg =1 .
The previous solution assumed that q<1. To get the bounds on when q =1 , substitute
the solution for kreg, assuming kreg < 1,i n t o
q =
R − (1 − kreg)rD
4c
=
RrD − 4c(rE − rD)
2crD
.
From here, we see that for c>
RrD
4rE−2rD ⇔ R<2c
2rE−rD
rD , q<1. Otherwise, for R>
2c
2rE−rD
rD , q =1and k should be set such that q(k)=1⇔ kreg =
4c+rD−R
rD .N o t e ,h o w e v e r ,
that for R<4c this solution would imply that kreg > 1, which is not feasible. Therefore, for
R<4c,w eo b t a i nt h a tkreg =1 , which implies that q = R
4c < 1.
One ﬁnal point that needs to be veriﬁed is that, for R<2c
2rE−rD
rD ,t h e nq =
R−(1−k)rD
4c <
1, but that for R>8c
(rE−rD)
rD ,w eh a v et h a tkreg =1 , which would imply that q = R
4c.
N o t e ,h o w e v e r ,t h a tf o rb o t ho ft h e s ec o n d i t i o n st ob et r u ea tt h es a m et i m er e q u i r e st h a t
8c
(rE−rD)
rD < 2c
2rE−rD
rD . This will be satisﬁed if and only if 4(rE − rD) < 2rE − rD ⇔
rE < 3
2rD. We can now use this in the necessary condition for q<1,w h i c hi sR<2c
2rE−rD
rD .
Given the restriction on rE and rD,t h er i g h th a n ds i d em u s tb el e s st h a n2c
2(
3
2rD)−rD
rD =4 c.
Therefore, the joint assumption that R<2c
2rE−rD
rD and R>8c
(rE−rD)
rD implies that R<4c,
and consequently that q = R
4c < 1,a sd e s i r e d .¤
29P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :We begin with the case of parameter values such that q,k < 1,
and show that there exists a value e rD > 0 such that kreg <k CS if and only if rD < e rD.
Consider the solution that maximizes consumer surplus, kCS, and assume that R<4c and
c> R2
16rE, which implies that q,kCS < 1. From the condition deﬁning kCS,
Π =
¡
R − (1 − kCS)rD
¢2
16c
− k
CSrE =0 ,
one can clearly see that, as rD → 0, kCS → R2
16crE < 1 for c> R2
16rE.
By contrast, kreg is deﬁned by
∂SW
∂k
=
rD
4c
µ
R +( 1− kreg)rD
2
¶
+ rD − rE =0 .
For rD → 0, kreg → 0 as well, since it is optimal to just have deposit-based ﬁnance. These
two results together imply that there is some threshold rD such that, for rD <r D, kreg <k CS.
At the other extreme, we consider the solutions as rD → rE.F o r c> R2
16rE, kCS =
8c−R+rE−4
√
(4c−R+rE)c
rE < 1.B y c o m p a r i s o n ,kreg → 1 as rD → rE f o ra l lp a r a m e t e rv a l u e s .
Therefore, we can also conclude that there must exist some threshold rD such that, for
rD > rD, kreg >k CS.
Comparing the two values of k, kreg <k CS if and only if
k
reg =
RrD + r2
D − 8c(rE − rD)
r2
D
<
8crE − RrD + r2
D − 4
p
rEc(4crE − RrD + r2
D)
r2
D
= k
CS
Rearranging, we obtain the condition for kreg − kCS < 0 as:
2
r2
D
µ
RrD +4 crD − 8crE +2
q
crE (4crE − RrD + r2
D)
¶
< 0
Since we know that for low values of rD this condition will be satisﬁed, but not for higher
values, we can establish that there is a unique threshold where the inequality ﬂips (i.e., that
30rD = rD)i ft h ed i ﬀerence kreg − kCS is either concave or convex in rD.F o r t h i s , w e o n l y
need the second derivative of the term inside the parenthesis, which yields
∂2
∂r2
D
µ
RrD +4 crD − 8crE +2
q
crE (4crE − RrD + r2
D)
¶
=
1
2 (16crE − R2)
¡√
crE
¢
(4crE − RrD + r2
D)
³p
4crE − RrD + r2
D
´ > 0,
since by assumption c> R2
16rE.
The ﬁnding that the function kreg−kCS is convex implies that kreg−kCS c a na tm o s tc r o s s
zero twice, the ﬁrst time from above and the second from below. However, two crossings are
inconsistent with the ﬁnding in the proposition above that for low values of rD, kreg−kCS < 0,
while for high values of rD, kreg − kCS > 0. Therefore, kreg − kCS =0at one unique point,
which implies that rD = rD = e rD , and we have just one threshold, as desired.
We next proceed to the case where q =1in both cases, which is true for suﬃciently large
R,b u tt h a tk<1. Start with the case of consumer surplus maximization, where, for R>4c,
q =1and kCS = c
rE.F o rt h ec a s ew i t hr e g u l a t i o n ,w eh a v et h a tf o rR>max{2c
2rE−rD
rD ,4c},
q =1and kreg =
4c+rD−R
rD .T h e r e f o r e ,kreg <k CS ⇔
4c + rD − R
rD
<
c
rE
This last inequality can be solved for rD to yield the condition
rD <r E
µ
R − 4c
rE − c
¶
,
which establishes that kreg − kCS < 0 if and only if rD < e rD = rE
³
R−4c
rE−c
´
,a sd e s i r e d .
T h el a s tc a s ei sap o s s i b l e“ m i x e d ”c a s e ,i nw h i c hm o n i t o r i n gm a yb ea tam a x i m u m
for one solution but not the other. It is straightforward to show that the only case of
relevance is where, with a slight abuse of notation, qCS =1but qreq < 1. This occurs for
31RrD
2(2rE−rD) <c<R
4, and in this range kCS = c
rE and kreg =
RrD+r2
D−8c(rE−rD)
r2
D . The diﬀerence
kreg − kCS simpliﬁes to
(rE − c)r
2
D +( R +8 c)rErD − 8cr
2
E =0
The relevant solution is
e rD =
rE(R+8c)−
√
32c2+R2+16c(R+2rE)
2(c − rE)
,
which implies kreg >k CS only if rD > e rD. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 :Assume that there is an excess supply of funds so that, as before,
consumer surplus is maximized by setting
rL =
R +( 1− k)cD
2
.
We can substitute this into the equation for q, recalling that cD =
rD
q ,a n ds o l v ef o rq to
obtain q1 = 1
8c
³
R +
p
R2 − 16crD (1 − k)
´
and q2 = 1
8c
³
R −
p
R2 − 16crD (1 − k)
´
.W e
focus again on the Pareto dominant equilibrium with a higher level of monitoring (q1).
We proceed by maximizing CS with respect to the choice of capital, k. However,
we know from above that the combination of rL =
R+(1−k)cD
2 and the highest possible
k will be optimal for borrowers. We therefore introduce the participation constraint for
the bank, that Π = q(rL − (1 − k)cD) − krE − cq2 ≥ 0. Substituting for rL gives q =
1
8c
³
R +
p
R2 − 16crD (1 − k)
´
,a n dw eo b t a i n
Π = cq
2 − krE = c
µ
1
8c
³
R +
p
R2 − 16crD (1 − k)
´¶2
− krE =0
Focusing on parameter values for which there is an interior solution for k, the solution is
k
CS =
1
2c(4rE − rD)
2
µ
R
2rE +2 cr
2
D − 8crDrE − R
q
rE (R2rE +4 cr2
D − 16rEcrD)
¶
.
32To maximize social welfare in the absence of deposit insurance, we need to solve
max
k
SW = Π + CS = qR− (1 − k)rD − krE − cq
2.
The FOC yields
∂SW
∂k
=
∂q
∂k
(R − 2cq)+rD − rE =0 .
Using
∂q
∂k =
rD √
16ckrD−16crD+R2, we can substitute into the FOC and solve for k,w h i c hy i e l d s
k
reg =
1
2
18cr3
D − 48cr2
DrE +3 2 crDr2
E +3 R2rDrE − 2R2r2
E
crD (4rE − 3rD)
2 .
Comparing these two solutions, we note that as rD → 0,w eh a v et h a t ,a sb e f o r e ,kCS →
R2
16crE. By contrast, for the case of social welfare maximization it is easy to see from the
FOC that as rD → 0, kreg → 0 as well. Therefore, for rD suﬃciently small, we have that
kreg <k CS,a sd e s i r e d .¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 :Note that bank proﬁt maximization with respect to k yields the
following FOC:
∂Π
∂k
=
∂q
∂k
(rL − (1 − k)cD)+qcD − q(1 − k)
∂cD
∂k
− rE − 2cq
∂q
∂k
= qcD − rE − q(1 − k)
∂cD
∂k
.
Since qcD = rD,
∂cD
∂q = −
rD
q2 ,a n d ,g i v e nq = 1
4c
³
R +
p
R2 − 8crD (1 − k)
´
when rL = R−
rB
q ,
that
∂q
∂k =
rD √
R2−8crD(1−k) > 0, the FOC becomes :
rD − rE +( 1− k)
rD
q
rD p
R2 − 8crD (1 − k)
=0 .
Evaluating at k =0 , ∂Π
∂k is clearly positive for rD → rE. Substituting in for q,w ec a nﬁnd
33the limiting value of ∂Π
∂k explicitly as rD → rE,w h i c hb e c o m e s
lim
rD→rE
µ
rD − rE +
rD
q
rD √
R2 − 8crD
¶
=
1
4
rE
3R −
√
R2 − 8crE √
R2 − 8crE
>
1
4
rE
2R
√
R2 − 8crE
> 0
Therefore, k>0 even for the case where there is an excess demand for credit. ¤
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